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yUkraine’s cooperation with the IMF 
– unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms
Sławomir Matuszak
The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been 
plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external 
markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve 
gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its 
resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provi-
ded for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of 
the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive 
reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; howe-
ver, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of 
the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. 
As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this 
March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the 
IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s econo-
mic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform 
of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt.
The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the 
wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Re-
gions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the in-
terests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, 
these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, 
the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm 
their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms 
are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect 
public support for the ruling group.
Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s 
cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is 
continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after 
the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.
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Out of the crisis, and on to cooperation with the IMF
In 2008-2009, Ukraine was worst hit of all the CIS states by the economic crisis, the main 
reason being the slump in demand for Ukrainian exports on global markets. The populist 
pre-election policy adopted by the then Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who disregarded 
the agreements with the IMF, made things even worse. As a result, the country’s GDP 
dropped by 15.1% in 2009, and in November that year the IMF suspended its cooperation 
with Ukraine.
In early 2010, following the presidential elections and its final assumption of power, 
the Party of Regions had to face numerous economic challenges, the most urgent being 
the need to improve the state of public finances. The necessary condition was to resume 
cooperation with the IMF, which ensured access to loans with a relatively low interest rate, 
and helped to improve the country’s image on the financial markets. The appointment of the 
government in March 2010 was in itself a sign of political stabilisation, and led to the first 
increase of Ukraine’s credit rating since the beginning of the crisis1.
One of the first decisions taken by Mykola Azarov’s government was to resume talks with 
the IMF. In July 2010, the parties reached an agreement concerning a new 29-month 
$15.1 billion stand-by funding programme. The memorandum of cooperation stated that 
successive tranches of about $1.5 billion each would be released every quarter, depen-
ding on Ukraine’s progress in meeting the 
obligations indicated in the memorandum. 
The first tranches were to be spent on di-
rect support to the Ukrainian budget, and 
the following ones on increasing the Na-
tional Bank of Ukraine’s foreign reserves. 
The priorities set by both parties in the 
memorandum included the consolidation 
of public finances (by reducing the budget 
deficit to 3.5% of GDP in 2011 and to 2.5% of GDP in 2012); adopting the pension re-
form; reforming the gas and fuel sector (by imposing market prices on gas and restructuring 
Naftogaz); strengthening the banking sector and increasing the independence of the Natio-
nal Bank of Ukraine; and making monetary policy more flexible.
The commitments included in the memorandum on cooperation with the IMF, and the 
employment of the conditionality principle in releasing funds (a principle which PM Tymo-
shenko had defied) stirred hope for deeper economic reforms. They also corresponded with 
President Viktor Yanukovych’s own declarations. The government could have implemented 
painful social changes quickly, justifying itself with the IMF’s demands, and shifting the bla-
me for the disastrous economic situation onto its predecessors. However, the task proved 
much harder to carry out.
Reforms in practice
At first, the Ukrainian government began implementing the necessary changes vigorously. 
Ukraine received the first tranche of the IMF loan, once the law that was supposed to re-
duce the budget deficit in 2010 to 5.5% was passed and a 50-percent raise in gas prices 
for the population was introduced. In September 2010, Ukraine succeeded in finding pur-
chasers for $2 billion worth of its Eurobonds at favourable interest rates. This was the first 
successful issuance of treasury bonds since 2008.
In December the Ukrainian parliament passed a budget for 2011 that was compliant with 
the commitments included in the cooperation memorandum with the IMF (among other 
1 Standard & Poor’s upgraded 
Ukraine’s foreign currency 
sovereign rating from CCC+/C 
to B-/C, and its local currency 
rating from B-/C to B/B. 
The rating outlook was also 
changed to positive.
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The commitments included in the 
memorandum on cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund and the 
employment of conditionality principle 
in releasing funds have stirred hope 
of deeper economic reforms in Ukraine.
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things, the budget deficit was reduced to 3%). In response to this, and the government’s 
promise to adopt the pension reform the same month, the IMF Board of Directors decided 
to release another tranche of the loan. However, by the end of 2010 the pace of the reforms 
had slowed down considerably.
Monetary policy – no problem
The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) is one institution which has met its commitments 
relatively well. The Bank has been acting according to the arrangements concerning mo-
netary policy, such as the increase of currency reserves and maintaining a stable exchange 
rate for the hryvnia (UAH). In May, the currency reserves exceeded $39 billion, reaching 
their highest level in Ukraine’s history. 
The exchange rate of the hryvnia has 
also been stable for the last 12 months. 
In May 2011, the National Bank of Ukra-
ine, following the arrangements with the 
IMF, adopted a series of regulations which 
liberalised the financial market. The NBU 
has once again allowed the banks to carry 
out swap operations on both the Ukrainian 
and international foreign exchange mar-
kets. The banks were allowed to sell and 
buy currencies on the interbank market during a single session (hitherto they could either 
buy or sell them); restrictions on the sale of currencies to individuals have been lifted2.
The changes implemented have ensured greater liquidity in the foreign exchange market. 
Their implementation was relatively easy, as these changes did not affect the interests of 
any important oligarchic lobby.
Socially painful reforms
At the same time, more and more points of contention arose between the IMF and the 
Ukrainian government. The greatest problem is currently the implementation of the pension 
reform, whose main provision is to raise the retirement age for women from 55 to 60 years, 
and to extend the minimum length of service from 5 to 15 years. In Ukraine, spending on 
pensions accounts for 18% of the GDP, which is one of the highest rates in the world. 
Despite the promises made to the IMF, the government has repeatedly postponed adoption 
of the appropriate laws. Initially, the reform was to be adopted by the end of 2010, then 
in mid-March 2011, but President Yanukovych stated that the project was not ready to be 
read in parliament, as the public consultations had not been carried out in a proper manner. 
The project was then returned to the government for revision, and it is not clear whether it 
will be voted by the parliament during the current session3.
The Ukrainian government is aware of the necessity to implement the pension reform. 
The current retirement age for women is irrational, as their average life expectancy is 74 years 
(in comparison, average male life expectancy is 62 years). The main impediment to this re-
form is the Party of Regions’ fear of further decline in its popularity. Parliamentary elections 
are scheduled for autumn 2012, and polls show that the last year has brought a rapid dec-
line in the support for the ruling party – from 39.1% in April 2010 to 15.7% in April 20114. 
Another important reason is the fear that this reform may stir social unrest in Ukraine.
No less problematic is the gas sector reform. Ukraine has pledged to keep the deficit of 
the state-owned Naftogaz concern below 8.5 billion hryvnia ($1.07 billion) in 2011, and as 
of next year Naftogaz is to manage without budget subsidies. One way to achieve this was 
2 By doing so, Ukraine has 
returned to pre-crisis solutions 
(in 2009 Yulia Tymoshenko 
attempted to tackle the crisis 
by introducing restrictions on 
the foreign exchange market).
3 The Supreme Council (the 
Ukrainian parliament) works in 
two sessions: the spring ses-
sion (from February to early 
July), and the autumn session 
(From September to January).
4 The survey of support for poli-
tical parties was conducted by 
the Razumkov Centre.
OSW.WAW.PL
The main impediment to the pension 
reform is the Party of Regions’ fear 
of a further decline in its popularity. 
The parliamentary elections are sche-
duled for 2012, and polls have shown 
a decline in the support for the ruling 
party,from 39.1% in April 2010 to 
15.7% in April 2011.
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to raise gas prices for individual customers up to the market level (they are currently much 
lower than for industrial customers, who pay the full market price). This difference in prices 
has badly affected Naftogaz’s financial condition, and has impeded the implementation of 
an energy-efficient policy. After the first 50% price rise was introduced, the IMF agreed 
to fulfil Kyiv’s request and adopted a more moderate stance. Instead of another 50% rise, 
it was reduced and divided into two stages – a 20% raise in April and another of 10% 
in July. The IMF’s condition was that the 
budget deficit must remain at the previo-
us level, and that the government should 
find additional means for it. Despite this 
agreement, the government has not raised 
the gas prices as yet. The factor that has 
yet again postponed the raise is the falling 
public support for the Party of Regions.
Influential lobbies are blocking the changes
The gas price raise is by no means the only problem with the gas sector. A number of cases 
from recent months have shown that the specific interests of individual business groups 
mean more than agreements with the IMF which should provide for a gradual improvement 
of Naftogaz’s finances. This may make it much more difficult to keep the budget deficit 
below 3.5% in 2011 (subsidies to Naftogaz are included in this deficit). If this policy is 
continued, it is unlikely that subsidies for Naftogaz in 2012 will be abolished.
The most glaring example of decisions that caused losses to the state-owned Naftogaz was 
the decisions taken by the government which favoured the Rosukrenergo company (RUE). 
Dmytro Firtash, the co-owner of RUE, represents an influential lobby which includes mem-
bers of government (such as the energy minister Yuri Boyko) and close associates of Viktor 
Yanukovych (such as the head of the pre-
sidential administration Serhiy Lovoch-
kin). One of the cases when the govern-
ment favoured the lobbies at the expense 
of state companies was the ruling of the 
Arbitration Tribunal in Stockholm in June 
2010 which ordered Naftogaz to transfer 
12.1 billion m3 of gas back to RUE. The 
Ukrainian government has not taken any 
steps to seek a less harsh ruling against 
Naftogaz5. Moreover, in an agreement between RUE and Naftogaz concerning the return 
of gas, the chosen version of the agreement clearly favoured RUE, while the state-owned 
company suffered a loss amounting to $900 million. Another similar example was Nafto-
gaz’s January decision to withdraw its claims against UkrGazEnergo (a subsidiary of RUE) 
for a gas transit fee amounting to 1 billion hryvnia.
In April, Naftogaz was deprived of its monopoly status in gas imports for domestic reci-
pients6. Earlier, UkrGazEnergo received a licence to sell 4.8 billion m3 of gas on Ukrainian 
territory. This decision will generate multimillion losses for Naftogas, as UkrGazEnergo is 
likely to take over part of Ukraine’s industrial customers.
Problems with liberalisation
In the memorandum signed with the IMF, Ukraine pledged to liberalise the agricultural 
market. Agricultural production and processing are one of the most important (and most 
 
 
 
 
-
5  It should be admitted that the 
takeover of gas by the Tymo-
shenko government in 2009 
was in fact illegal, although 
the current government could 
have sought a more lenient 
ruling from the court.
6 Naftogaz was not formally 
a monopolist: since 2008, 
Gazpromzbyt (a subsidiary of 
Gazprom) has had the right to 
sell up to 25% of the imported 
gas assigned for industrial 
recipients.
The specific interests of individual 
business groups mean more than 
agreements with the IMF which would 
provide for a gradual improvement of 
Naftogaz’s finances. If this policy is 
continued, it is unlikely that subsidies 
for Naftogaz will be abolished in 2012.
Contrary to the agreement with the 
IMF, the Ukrainian government has 
not introduced the second increase 
of gas prices for the general public. 
The impeding factor is yet again 
anxiety about social unrest.
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promising) sectors of the Ukrainian economy. Unlike other sectors, it is not dominated 
by any of the large oligarchic groups. Within recent months, the government has taken 
a number of steps to strengthen the role of the state in the agricultural sector, and has an-
nounced further similar decisions. As of February, contacts with foreign recipients have to 
be registered on the state agricultural stock. The government is planning to set up a state 
insurance company which will operate on the agricultural market. Even though similar 
measures are used in other countries, strengthening the state’s role runs counter to the 
IMF recommendations.
Moreover, the state has interfered with the market to favour individual companies. In Octo-
ber 2010 the government introduced export quotas for grain, officially to prevent excessive 
price rises on the domestic market following a poor harvest. It soon turned out, however, 
that most of the orders made did not go to the major agricultural companies active on the 
market, but to a previously unknown company called Khlib Investbud. Initially this com-
pany was presented as a state-owned enterprise; it later turned out that the state holds 
a minority stake in the company (49%), while the remaining shares are owned by stake-
holders from Cyprus and Russia. In fact, there are reasons to believe that Khlib Investbud 
is controlled by businessmen associated with President Yanukovych.
Despite the pressure from the IMF, the 
validity term of the export quotas was 
extended several times, which helped 
Khlib Investbud to strengthen its position 
on the agricultural market. It was only in 
May when the Ukrainian parliament deci-
ded that as of 1 July, these quotas will be 
replaced by export duties on grain, which 
should ensure fairer conditions of export.
Another example of ‘liberalisation’, and 
another bone of contention in talks with 
the IMF, is the confusion caused around 
the creation of a central securities depository. Even though the Ukrainian government has 
formally complied with the IMF requirements, it has done so in such a way as to sustain the 
control of the state (and associated oligarchs) over the institution that is being created.
At the moment, there are three depositories in Ukraine. The first is the All-Ukrainian 
Securities Depository (a private company, although not owned by any of the oligarchic 
groups), which controls over 80% of the market. The second is the National Depository of 
Ukraine (86% of whose shares are owned by the state) and the third is the depository at 
the National Bank of Ukraine, which operates with securities of state enterprises. One of 
the International Monetary Fund’s requirements was that a single institution be established 
to take charge of registering securities. The IMF’s representatives assumed that the single 
depository would be established on the basis of the All-Ukrainian Securities Depository, 
the company which is most popular with the customers. However, in February the govern-
ment decided to set up the central depository on the basis of the National Depository of 
Ukraine and the depository at the National Bank of Ukraine. This decision has sparked 
opposition from the IMF, which had favoured a depository that would be owned largely by 
private capital. The government in Kyiv resisted this pressure; in April, the deputy head 
of the presidential administration, Iryna Akimova, announced that the central depository 
would be set up by the end of June. The main shareholder will be the state, and most 
likely significant influence over the depository will be exerted by Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s 
richest businessman.
The confusion around the creation of 
a central securities depository shows 
that even though the Ukrainian go-
vernment has formally complied with 
the IMF requirements, it has done so 
in a way which allows the control of 
the state (and associated oligarchs) 
over this institution to be maintained.
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Suspension of the loan
The third tranche of the IMF loan was to be spent on increasing the foreign exchange re-
serves of the National Bank of Ukraine, and was initially planned to be released in March 
2011. However, the IMF expert mission which visited Ukraine in February did not recom-
mend releasing the funds in its report. Even though talks have continued, Ukraine has not 
so far received these funds. PM Mykola Azarov has even declared that Ukraine can manage 
without the IMF’s money, although he admitted that this would affect the country badly.
According to the IMF’s representative in Kyiv, Max Alier, in order to receive another tranche 
of the loan, Ukraine must adopt the pension reform, raise gas prices and guarantee that 
Naftogaz’s deficit will not exceed the agreed level.
Prospects for cooperation...
Despite the problems observed and the suspension of loans, Ukraine is unlikely to stop its 
cooperation with the IMF. The Ukrainian government owes its current assertiveness to the 
improvement in the economic situation. But even though the first months of 2011 brought 
positive changes to the Ukrainian economy (GDP rose by over 5% in the first quarter), it has 
still failed to achieve the pre-crisis level, and it is far from certain that this growth will be 
sustained. The GDP is heavily dependent on exports (principally of metallurgical products), 
and those in turn depend on the condition of foreign markets. The recent developments in 
Middle Eastern countries (who are important recipients of Ukrainian products) have caused a 
significant slowdown of industrial produc-
tion growth, especially in the metallurgical 
and machine sectors. This slowdown was 
one of the reasons why Standard & Poor’s 
agency lowered its forecast for Ukraine’s 
GDP growth to 3.8%.
In theory, Ukraine could give up the IMF 
loan completely, and obtain the necessa-
ry amount of funds by issuing treasury 
bonds and borrowing money abroad, for 
example from Russia. However, these alternatives would have a much higher interest 
rate, and are therefore more expensive (the IMF loans are the cheapest option available). 
Moreover, maintaining cooperation with the IMF is a requirement for obtaining loans from 
the World Bank and getting macro-financial assistance from the EU. In this situation, 
the most likely scenario is that Ukraine and the IMF will reach a compromise, for example 
by adopting a pension reform in a somewhat milder version than previously agreed, and by 
implementing other reforms to a lesser extent than the IMF had initially demanded.
Further developments will depend on the prospects for Ukraine’s economic growth. It can-
not be ruled out that if the dynamic GDP and industrial production growth is sustained, 
the government may choose to postpone the reforms and prolong the talks with the IMF 
until the parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn 2012.
... and reforms
It remains an open question as to how deep the Ukrainian government’s conviction to 
implement the promised economic reforms really is. Even though the current government 
is the most reform-oriented cabinet since at least 2006, its reformist zeal is fading from 
month to month as the parliamentary elections approach. Advocates of deeper reforms – 
The most likely scenario is that Ukra-
ine and the IMF will reach a com-
promise, e.g. by adopting a pension 
reform in a somewhat milder version 
than initially agreed, and by imple-
menting other reforms to a lesser 
extent than the IMF had required.
i s s u e  5 2  |  1 5 . 0 6 . 2 0 1 1  |  C e n t r e  f o r  e a s t e r n  s t u d i e s
Commentaryosw
7OSW.WAW.PL
© Copyright by OSW
Editors: Adam Eberhardt, 
Anna Łabuszewska, 
Katarzyna Kazimierska
Translation: Jadwiga Rogoża
Co-operation: Jim Todd
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) was established in 1990. CES is financed from the budget. 
The Centre monitors and analyses the political, economic and social situation in Russia, Central 
and Eastern European countries, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Central Asia. 
CES focuses on the key political, economic and security issues, such as internal situations 
and stability of the mentioned countries, the systems of power, relations between political 
centres, foreign policies, issues related to NATO and EU enlargement, energy supply security, 
existing and potential conflicts, among other issues. 
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Polish government. 
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6A, 
00-564 Warsaw
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl 
such as the deputy head of presidential administration Iryna Akimova and the deputy PM 
Serhiy Tihipko – are losing their influence.
At the moment, the main impediment to the reforms is the ruling group’s fear of further 
decline in public support and possible social unrest. In recent months, protests against the 
economic difficulties have brought together more participants (small businessmen, teachers, 
industrial workers and others) than those previously organised by political parties. Polls also 
show that the level of discontent and readiness to participate in protests is growing among 
the Ukrainian public. On the other hand, the Ukrainian ruling class seems pretty unanimous 
in their belief that socially painful reforms (such as raising the retirement age or municipal 
utility charges) simply must be implemented. It can be expected that the government will 
take firmer steps in those spheres after the 2012 parliamentary elections.
However, the oligarchs’ ties with the current government will be definitely a much greater 
obstacle to overcome: these ties have postponed or even precluded the reforms in some 
crucial sectors. In the case of the gas 
sector reform, the imposition of market 
prices on gas for individual recipients and 
a further liberalisation of the market are 
merely a question of time – provided that 
the reform is implemented in a manner 
that benefits the gas lobby. Changes that 
would harm the interests of this lobby – 
such as an improvement in Naftogaz’s fi-
nancial condition – seem unlikely as long 
as the current elite holds power. Nonetheless, those reforms that do not raise excessive 
controversy (such as the banking sector reform) can be expected to continue..
The oligarchs’ ties with the current 
government will be a much greater 
obstacle to overcome: these ties have 
postponed or even prevented reforms in 
some crucial sectors. Nonetheless, those 
reforms that do not raise excessive con-
troversy can be expected to continue.
